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Chapter 7
Kant’s Apophaticism of Finitude: A
Grammar of Hope for Speaking
Humanly of God

Philip J. Rossi
Theology Department, Marquette University
Milwaukee, WI

Kant rarely frames his discussions of God, faith, and religion in
terms that explicitly focus on questions about the structure, use and
limits of religious language, matters that have come to be of major
concern to later philosophers of religion. His relative neglect of
questions of religious language is hardly surprising, however, when
placed in relation, first, to the leading question that provides impetus
to the one major treatise on religion, Religion Within the Boundaries of
Mere Reason, that he published as part of his critical philosophy, and
second, to the surrounding intellectual contexts within which he
produced the range of texts that taken together constitute his
philosophical account of religion. Yet even though these factors limit
the explicit attention he pays to language as it functions in religious
belief and practice, his discussions nonetheless point to the possibility
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of articulating distinctively Kantian modes of engaging questions about
the forms and uses of religious language.
This essay will explore one of these modes: it is one that, I shall
argue, brings to bear on questions of religious language a fundamental
concern that shapes Kant’s larger account of religion within his critical
project. This concern is to locate the function of religion, understood in
terms of humanity’s moral construal of its relation to God, within the
distinctive vocation to which Kant sees humanity called in view of its
unique status as the juncture of nature and freedom: to recognize, to
respect, and to live in accord with the limits and the ends of the finite
reason with which it engages the cosmos. As Kant articulates this
vocation, it is one that humanity can fulfill only within the concrete
workings of culture, society, and history by efforts to bring about the
social conditions that make attainment of “the highest good” possible;
chief among the conditions for attaining such good is a world order
that makes possible an enduring peace among nations. In
consequence, I will propose that, within the context of Kant’s
understanding of humanity’s moral vocation, an account of the
language humans use to speak of God and their relation to God
requires articulating the bearing of that language upon the task of
securing lasting peace that Kant sees morally incumbent upon all
humanity.

Hope: Making Human Space for Speaking of God
Kant does not frame the main question at issue in Religion,
“What is then the result of this right conduct of ours?” as one that
arises directly out of human religious belief and practice.1 He sees
it rising, instead, from the exigencies of the exercise of human moral
reason as its scope and function had been critically elucidated in the
Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Practical Reason.2 To the
extent that Kant’s main concern in Religion focuses upon the
conditions—both personal and social—that sustain a lifetime of
conscientious human moral conduct and bring it to its due conclusion,
his text often shows far more interest in delimiting what we may
properly say about the structural features of the moral deliberation
that guides human action than with what humans may properly say
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about God. Yet it is not only this internal conceptual structure of
Religion that deflects his attention from questions of language. At the
time Kant wrote this work, not only was philosophy of religion in a
nascent state as a distinct field of inquiry, but language had yet to be
fully thematized as a central focus preoccupying philosophical
investigation. As a result, Kant’s treatise on religion does not so much
yield a fullfledged philosophy of religion nor does it provide a clearly
developed account of religious language, as much as it offers a moral
anthropology from which to situate a range of human moral conduct
and religious phenomena within which the languages of religious belief
and practice function.
Even though questions of language do not stand front and
center in Kant’s account of the relation in which humanity stands to
that which it deems divine, important consequences for understanding
the function and scope of the language humans use to articulate and
respond to that relation nonetheless follow from his account. So as a
first step in identifying and exploring those consequences, it will be
useful to show how, even though these aspects of Kant’s context limit
the attention he explicitly pays to language in his discussion of
religion, his account nonetheless opens an important conceptual space
from which to pose questions about human efforts to speak,
respectively, of God, of humanity’s relation to God, and of the place of
that relation in human moral endeavor. The space that his account
opens is, as I will indicate below, delimited in terms of the hope that is
central to the moral anthropology governing Kant’s critical philosophy,
namely, the hope that such moral conduct will be effective for securing
humanity’s “highest good.” Once this space of hope has been marked
out as the locus from which it is proper for humans to speak of God
and of humanity’s relation to God, we can then turn, in the following
section, to the task of identifying within that space those elements of
Kant’s account that, two centuries later, continue to have import for
philosophical inquiries into the scope, shape, and function of religious
language.
In seeking to gain this purchase upon questions of religious
language within the larger ambit of Kant’s treatment of religion, it is
important to recognize that Kant did not construct his treatments of
God, faith, and religion as a “philosophy of religion” as that term now
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applies to a particular field of philosophical study. It is certainly the
case that Kant’s pre-critical and critical discussions of the concept of
God, as well as his articulation of “moral faith” as a distinctive element
in his critical writings, had a formative role in what James Collins has
called “the emergence of philosophy of religion.”3 Yet Kant dealt with
them not as if they were elements constituting “religion” as a clearly
focused object for philosophical inquiry but rather as matters
embedded within his larger critical restructuring of philosophical
inquiry, a project that did not result in—and perhaps even helped to
preclude—his taking explicit thematic focus on language as a central
component for his analyses of human activities, including those that
function religiously. While throughout the course of his philosophical
career he engaged many major issues now linked together as
elements of philosophy of religion, his principal interest in these topics
originally had a robust metaphysical focus typical of mid-eighteenthcentury school philosophy in Germany. His main concern in exploring
questions about human efforts to render the divine intelligible was to
articulate the theoretical status and function of the concept of God
within a systematically ordered set of basic philosophical principles
that account for the order and structure of the world.
Yet as his thinking moves along the trajectory leading to the
critical turn, the function of his discussions of God, faith, and religion
undergoes a transformation that reorients them with respect to these
original metaphysical concerns. He now also places them within a
purview in which the central focus is anthropological—on articulating
what is constitutive of humanity as the unique juncture of nature and
freedom—and for which a crucial question is anticipatory—what hopes
can such a uniquely constituted humanity legitimately set before itself
in view of the limits it must critically place on the uses of the finite
reason with which it engages nature and freedom?4 This
anthropological focus and its anticipatory question may thus be taken
as key coordinates that delimit the space that Kant’s account opens for
raising questions bearing upon language—even ones that he does not
explicitly articulate—particularly as each coordinate functions to mark
out the space of finitude for the uniquely constituted human task to
serve as the juncture of nature and freedom. Once within that space,
moreover, Kant’s discussions of God, faith, and religion move in a
direction along which questions about language, framed as what may
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most appropriately be said—or what is better left unsaid—about God
(as well as about how the human stands in relation to God) provide
crucial, though sometimes only peripherally discerned, markers for
properly delimiting the shape of the human and the horizon of its
hope. In moving along this direction, Kant’s discussions open up
possibilities for construing religious language as a grammar of hope
within the space of human finitude, possibilities that will be
explored in more detail in the next section.
Even as Kant’s work gave impetus to the development of
philosophy of religion as a distinctive field of philosophical inquiry, a
concern with language as a defining locus for philosophical inquiry that
would later bring about a full-fledged “linguistic turn” had started to
take shape in the work of some of Kant’s contemporaries, most
notably Herder.5 While this concern did not push language to the
forefront of Kant’s program of inquiry, questions of language—framed
in terms of some traditional metaphysical issues about God—still
bubble up through the inchoate eddying of philosophy of religion within
his critical project. He displays attention to language in dealing with
certain dimensions of the concept of God, most notably regarding the
terms or attributes that may or may not properly be predicated of God
metaphysically understood as ens realissimum. Such focus upon what
may be said (and not said) about God has a long philosophical and
theological pedigree, but even engagement with that element of the
tradition does not result in his paying sustained attention—as some
within that tradition had occasionally done—to ways in which these
questions bring to light a complex interplay between metaphysics and
grammar.6 On the evidence of the lecture notes from his teaching,
Kant’s treatment of the conceptual lineaments of many of the specific
attributes that had been standard loci in discussion for “rational
theology” (or a “natural theology”), construed as that branch of
metaphysics concerned with the infinite being of God, is often not
notably different from that proposed in the rationalist and scholastic
traditions represented in the textbook by Baumgarten that he regularly
used.7
The key differences from this prior tradition that arise in Kant’s
discussions thus do not principally bear upon matters of conceptual
detail regarding what may properly be said or not said of God in
The Linguistic Dimension of Kant’s Thought, (2014): pg. 154-173. Publisher link. This article is © Northwestern University
Press and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Northwestern University
Press does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express
permission from Northwestern University Press.

5

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

consequence of thinking God metaphysically—as Kant thinks human
reason will unavoidably do—in terms of concepts such as ens
realissimum. The interpretive attention that has long been paid to
Kant’s criticisms of what had become the standard arguments
advanced as proofs of the existence of a metaphysically conceived God
has tended to overshadow the fact that there are other dimensions of
human efforts to “think God” that Kant considers important for
his critical project even though, by his account, all speculative efforts
to prove the existence of God falter. The importance of these other
dimensions, in fact, becomes all the greater for Kant’s purposes in
light of the failure of the speculative proofs. Kant takes it to be the
case—and of significance—that even after the exercise of human
reason is kept within the critical limits ruling out the legitimacy of
efforts to construct a theoretical proof of the existence of God, reason
still will not be dissuaded from thinking God in metaphysical terms. So
rather than trying to prevent us from thinking in a way so embedded
in the inner dynamic of reason’s drive to comprehensive intelligibility
that he calls it a “natural disposition,”8 Kant’s strategy for keeping
such thinking within the limits of finite reason is to reorient it toward
the practical (moral) end he considers primary for the uses of human
reason. This reorientation is most famously signaled in the claim he
puts forth in the “Preface” to the second edition of the Critique of Pure
Reason, “Thus I had to deny knowledge in order to make room for
faith.”9 As a result, he provides a moral reading of the function and
import of human efforts to “think” God, particularly in terms of what
he calls, in the Critique of Pure Reason, the “transcendental Ideal.”
Kant’s moral reading of these human efforts to “think God” will thus be
particularly pertinent to developing an account of religious language
keyed to the anthropological concerns central to shaping his critical
project.
Kant’s proposal to reorient human efforts to “think” God” along
a moral trajectory also adhere, at least implicitly, to a principle long
operative in theological discourse that, in whatever we may try to say
of God, the apophatic has priority over the kataphatic, that is, in
human efforts to speak of God, we speak more truly of what God is
not, than we do of what God is. In Kant’s case this principle functions
in the care he uses, in his lectures as well as in his critical texts, to
distinguish what can legitimately be said with respect to the concept of
The Linguistic Dimension of Kant’s Thought, (2014): pg. 154-173. Publisher link. This article is © Northwestern University
Press and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Northwestern University
Press does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express
permission from Northwestern University Press.

6

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

God from what may be affirmed of God. With regard to the latter, Kant
clearly stands on the side of the apophaticism of a negative theology
that severely constrains what we may say of God. The Kantian
constraints are severe: we may not even say—as a claim adduced
from theoretical considerations—“God exists,” and, as a claim adduced
on moral grounds, neither may we say “It is morally certain that there
is a God,” though we may, on those moral grounds, say “I am morally
certain that there is a God.”10 With regard to the former—what may
legitimately be said of the concept of God—the constraints are also
stringent, but unlike those placed on a theoretically proposed claim
about God, need not render us speechless: we may properly say of the
concept of God those things that render it suitable for regulative use
by human reason with respect to the proper end set before humanity
as the unique juncture of freedom and nature. While this may not at
first seem like much, the task that Kant sees set before humanity as
its proper concrete end—the attainment of an order of enduring peace
for the worldwide human community—will provide ample space for
speaking in accord with the grammar of hope that he takes to be the
proper form in which humans may speak truly of God.
What then marks out Kant’s views as distinctive with respect to
the tradition he inherited, engaged, and helped to alter profoundly is
the practical (moral) significance he attributed to reason’s
authorization of speech—or of silence—in human discourse about God
and about humanity’s relation to God. The prime import of such an
authorization that issues from a critically chastened reason aware of
its limits has less to do with any positive knowledge of God that it
might yield, and far more to do with the power such authorization has
for orienting us rightly towards the articulation and the attainment of
the hope that is proper to our unique human status as the finite
juncture of nature and freedom. In keeping with Kant’s affirmation of
the primacy of the practical use of reason, what we do morally by
virtue of our speech and our silence about God provides the most
fundamental marker of the propriety, meaning, and truth of such
speech and such silence. This practical test, moreover, applies to more
than just what we do as individual agents. Since Kant construes the
social arena of human culture, politics, and history as the concrete
locus within which the attainment of this hope moves forward, the
manner in which we articulate our mutual human capacity and
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responsibility for enacting such hope together within our human social
space will also serve as a crucial marker for our speaking properly of
God and of the human relation to God. In consequence, the grammar
of hope in accord with which we may speak properly of God that is
implicit in Kant’s account of religion may be appropriately construed as
a grammar of social hope.

Finite Reason: Hope as Apophatic Grammar of
God
The discussion in the preceding section suggests at least three
coordinates from which the account of the function and the scope of
human finite reason that issues from Kant’s critical philosophy may be
brought to bear on questions about the structure, use, and limits of
religious language. The first is a theoretical apophaticism regarding
what may be said “of God” that is framed in recognition of the limits
that the finitude of human reason places upon the dynamic of
intelligibility that drives efforts to articulate a concept of God. The
second is an anthropology of finite reason that differentiates as
theoretical and practical the uses of reason by which humanity
engages the world in which it finds itself placed and that assigns
primacy to reason’s practical (moral) use in this human engagement
with the world. To the extent that Kant understands the practical use
of reason to be the exercise of human freedom, his anthropology of
finite reason is even more so an anthropology of human finite
freedom. The third is the social hope that human reason frames as the
focus for its moral engagement with the world, a hope that opens
space for mutual discourse among us about the shape of our social
interaction. These coordinates each play a role in delimiting the
movement of the critical project along an anthropological trajectory
focused upon the end that Kant sees forming the scope of the
distinctive vocation to which humanity is called in consequence of its
possession and exercise of finite reason: this end is to bring about,
through exercise of that reason, the juncture of nature and freedom.
On Kant’s account, human finite reason brings to nature—that is, to
the world as it “is”—the demand that it be shaped to accord with
freedom—that is, that it be re-formed into the world as it “ought to
be.”11 In consequence, shaping human action so that it makes it
possible for nature to accord with freedom—that is, so that it closes
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the gap between “ought” and “is”—constitutes the fundamental human
moral task.
Questions about the structure, use, and limits of religious
language may thus be articulated along this anthropological trajectory
of the critical project by locating them with respect to these
coordinates as they each bear upon the distinctively human moral
vocation to serve as the junction of nature and freedom. The first
coordinate, which enjoins reticence in what we attempt to say of God,
is of particular importance for delimiting the space of all our
questioning—be it about what we say of the human and the
anthropological or about what we say about the divine and the
religious—as a space of human questioning. It is only in the light of
the reticence enjoined by the first coordinate that it becomes possible
to exercise the requisite intellectual humility needed to take accurate
sight on the second coordinate. Kant constructs his anthropology of
human finite reason with full attention to the fact that one
fundamental truth we may utter about ourselves is also a negative
one, one that first of all affirms what we are not: we must be ready
always to acknowledge that we are not, nor ever will be, God. The
third coordinate then reminds us that, on Kant’s account, the human
space of our discourse and action is one for which we have the abiding
responsibility to make into a social space, a space in which reason
functions to hold before us, as the most fitting end for the shared
finitude of our humanity, peace among ourselves as a possibility that
is in our power to realize. Humanity’s moral vocation, as Kant
understands it, is one it can fulfill only within the concrete workings of
culture, society, and history; it will do so by efforts to bring about the
social conditions that make attainment of “the highest good” possible.
As we will see at the end of this discussion, it is not without
significance for an account of religious language that the most urgent
of these social conditions that Kant sees as incumbent for humanity to
work for is the establishment of an international order that would
make possible a condition of enduring peace among the peoples of the
world. It suggests that for Kant the possibility for speaking of God in a
manner appropriate to our humanity is a function of envisioning
ourselves as coworkers for enacting peace. How and why this is so will
emerge from a more detailed discussion of each of these coordinates
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and their relation to this fundamental concrete moral task that Kant
sees set before human reason.
Kant’s theoretical apophaticism is marked by his insistence that,
however natural it may be for us to articulate a concept of God to
satisfy the efforts of the theoretical use of our reason to attain
unconditioned and comprehensive intelligibility, there is nothing
affirmative that we may say truly about God on the basis of that
concept alone.12 Even though whatever those efforts yield as true with
respect to the inner logic of the concept of God as the “faultless
ideal”13 of reason—for example, that God must be conceived as ens
originarium, ens summum, ens entium14—may also very well be true
of God, our affirmation of any of them as true of God still cannot be
authorized in terms of the theoretical intelligibility proper to our finite
reason. It cannot be authorized inasmuch as it is only within the
spatiotemporal forms of sensible intuition that such theoretical
intelligibility yields that what we may speak of as true. Such
authorization may not be given in the case of the concept of God,
however, inasmuch as the inner logic of that concept requires that
whatever it may name or refers to not stand under conditions of
sensible intuition: any speaking of God is a speaking of that for which
sensible intuition may not function as frame for its intelligibility—a
circumstance that leaves the theoretical use of our own human reason
without proper purchase for affirming that concept as “true” of some
“thing” (i.e., an item of the kind Kant calls “phenomenon”) or of
“something” (i.e., that in-principle-unknowable “x” Kant calls
“noumenon”).15 Such apophaticism, however, does not render us
totally speechless, for it does allow us to utter at least one truth, even
though it is a truth about what God is not: God may neither be
conceived of nor affirmed as being “of” the spatiotemporal world.16 The
grammar of God is not a grammar of a “thing” that is “of” or “in” the
world.
The second coordinate may be termed Kant’s anthropology of
finite reason. He sees the human place in the cosmos delimited in
terms of the task set before finite reason to effect the juncture of
nature and freedom, the two mutually irreducible fields—of what is and
of what ought to be—that present themselves to us for the
engagement of our finite reason. This task, moreover, is one that is
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consequent upon the profound defining difference that separates us as
human from the divine. On this point, Kant’s anthropology of finite
reason and his theoretical apophaticism fully converge: effecting such
a juncture is a task is enjoined upon humanity inasmuch as we are not
God, for whom there can be no bifurcation between “freedom” and
“nature.” Our human place—and our human task from that place—is
delimited precisely to the extent that we recognize that we are not
God and the consequences that recognition has for how we take up
our moral task as humanity. As Susan Neiman observes:
Of the many distinctions Kant took wisdom and sanity to depend
upon drawing, none was deeper than the difference between
God and all the rest of us. Kant reminds us as often as possible
of all that God can do and we cannot. Nobody in the history of
philosophy was more aware of the number of ways we can
forget it. He was equally conscious of the temptation to idolatry,
the alternative route to confusing God with other beings. Kant’s
relentless determination to trace ways we forget our finitude
was matched only by his awareness that such forgetting is
natural.17
One consequence of delimiting our humanity so that we
appropriately attend to this all-important difference is that it mutually
implicates how we speak of God with how we speak of ourselves as
human. The principle of apophaticism, which restrains what we may
say that God is in view of attending first to what we must say that God
is not, may very well also apply to what we say of ourselves in making
claims about our humanity. The affirmation that we are not God, that
we are not divine, carries with it the consequence that even those few
claims that theoretical apophaticism licenses as proper to us to say of
the concept of God in terms of “transcendental predicates”18 may even
more surely not be said of humanity, be it collectively or individually.
We may not structure what we say of ourselves as human in accord
with a grammar of the divine—which would be a grammar of idolatry—
even as our “forgetting” of the difference between the human and the
divine impels us to encompass the divine within a grammar of the
human—which would be a grammar of anthropomorphism and
ontotheology. Apophaticism serves as finite reason’s mode of discipline
upon anthropomorphism in speaking of the divine and idolatry in
naming the non-divine as divine, both deeply rooted human impulses
that blur the difference between the human and the divine.
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Kant’s anthropology of finite reason thus marks off the
difference and the distance between the human and the divine with
respect to the concepts and the theoretical claims located within the
ambit of a “transcendental theology” ambitioning to speak of God in
metaphysical terms. Along this anthropological trajectory of the critical
project, moreover, there also lies a moral difference between the
human and the divine that has significant bearing upon the scope of
proper speech and proper silence regarding God, humanity, and the
relation between them that forms the space of religion. In positive
terms, this difference is signaled by the distinction Kant makes
between God’s “holy” will, before which there is no gap between what
is and what ought to be, and our human wills, which we each must
strive to form as a “good” will by efforts to shape the world as it is into
the world as it ought to be. In negative terms, this difference is
signaled by the presence of the “radical evil” that confronts human
moral efforts, both individual and social, to bridge the difference
between what is and what ought to be. Radical evil, articulated in
Kant’s technical terminology as a reversal in the order of one’s
(supreme) maxim for governing conduct, can be characterized as the
moral obduracy of self-preference, a systemic program of selfexception from the demand moral reason places on all by virtue of
their shared humanity.19 Over against such radical evil stands the
social hope that marks the third coordinate from which we may mark
out the shape of the language with which we may speak of God and of
the human relation to God in a manner proper to the limits of our finite
reason.
The difference and distance between the human and the divine
that radical evil marks off is not identical with that marked off by the
conceptual and metaphysical dimensions of the finitude that human
reason encounters at the limit of its theoretical use. That we are not
infinite, eternal, or omnipresent—none of these differences that mark
humanity as not divinity—does not constitute the radical evil in which
Kant takes humanity to stand; neither our “metaphysical distance”
from the divine, nor our contingency count as radical evil. For Kant,
finitude is not evil. Even so, radical evil issues, on Kant’s account, from
our finitude and stands as the most potent marker of the profound
divide we encounter between nature and freedom in the uses of our
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finite reason. In face of this divide, human finite reason is put in
question in ways that test the horizon of its hope that its exercise will
not thereby come to naught: does our finite reason provide us with a
capacity to overcome this divide so vividly marked by radical evil and,
if so, how are we to exercise that capacity in order to accomplish this
successfully? Both questions, as we shall see below, have an important
bearing for articulating a grammar of social hope that provides
structure for what we may say of God and of our human relation to
God.
Articulating and engaging Kant’s answer to these questions is
complicated by the conflicting ways he seems to deal with the
important prior question of whether it is inevitable that the divide that
our reason encounters between nature and freedom gives rise to the
distinctively moral fissure of “radical evil.” This question may be
framed in terms that bear upon the “grammar of hope” that Kant’s
account constructs in response to the “grammar of radical evil”: does
Kant’s account of finite reason require that we say evil is necessary so
that good may result? Conversely, to what extent does the hope that
his account presents as authorized by the practical use of human finite
reason provide a basis for saying evil is unnecessary?
On one side, his discussion in “A Conjectural Beginning of
Human History” (1786) recasts the Genesis account of the first human
sin into a narrative of the awakening and maturing of human reason
over against nature and of reason’s overcoming of the tutelage of
natural instinct in order to make its own autonomous way through the
world.20 In that account Kant seems to affirm that evil—or at least the
human struggle with evil—functions as an engine of the development
of human culture.21 There seems to be at least a historical and cultural
inevitability to evil. In contrast, in part 3 of Religion (1793), evil enters
the world in consequence of human engagement in a dynamics of
emulation occasioned by social relations: it is a corruption of our
finitude that we freely self-incur.22 In this later account Kant seems
more hesitant to affirm evil as an inevitable outcome of the workings
of finite human reason, as a necessary condition for a human moral
progress conceived as an overcoming of nature. Religion affirms that,
on the contrary, this self-incurred corruption is not an unavoidable
conflict between nature and freedom as they intersect in the human. It
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is, rather, an inner disordering within human reason that, even though
occasioned by the circumstances of our human placement within
nature, still has its fundamental root in and arises from an exercise of
human finite reason that reorients an agent’s freedom toward the
obduracy of self-preference.
On Kant’s account, the radical evil that disorients and corrupts
the human freedom that is governed by the practical use of human
finite reason can be appropriately countered only by a reorientation
brought about by the same finite reason that incurred the corruption.
Yet the corruption finite reason has incurred places it so firmly in the
grip of the obduracy of self-preference that it licenses us to speak of
evil as a “natural propensity” so “woven” into human nature that it
seems “inextirpable.”23 Within this condition of self-incurred
corruption, breaking the grip of radical evil turns upon the possibility of
reorienting human finite reason. For Kant such reorientation must be
reason’s own doing, not an outcome brought about by an external
agency: what freedom brought upon itself may only be undone in
freedom. Envisioning the possibilities for exercising our finite reason as
the agency that frees us from the grip of our obdurate self-preference
thus constitutes the first horizon for human moral hope. Such hope
thereby provides a “moral grammar” with which to articulate the
possibility for reorientation from evil back to good. What it enables us
to say is that radical evil is neither necessary nor inextirpable, even
after it has been self-incurred. This provides the space of possibility
within which we can then envision human finite reason having the
power to turn away in freedom from the radical evil of obdurate selfpreference.
There is more that this grammar of hope allows us to say with
respect to the self-preferential obduracy that forms the fundamental
dynamism of radical evil. The grammar of moral hope also provides
the structure for a syntax of moral recognition that places constraint
upon both explicit and implicit claims of self-preference; such syntax
can be found in the “universal law” formulation of the categorical
imperative, which places a veto on the self-preferential obduracy of
individual moral agents.24 It is also operative in the discourse of
mutual respect appropriate to membership and shared responsibility in
what Kant terms “a kingdom of ends.” In this context, a syntax of
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mortal recognition functions to clear a social space within which agents
address not only questions of individual human interaction but also
those dealing with the social governance of human life.25 On Kant’s
account, a grammar of hope functions to break the grip of selfpreferential obduracy with respect both to the moral life of individual
moral agents and to the structure and dynamics by which human
agents mutually govern their social, political, and cultural interaction.
In functioning to counter the grammar of self-preference
licensed by radical evil, a Kantian grammar of hope thus creates a
space of social possibility for full mutual respect for the exercise of
human finite freedom, a space that Kant names “an ethical
commonwealth.” The grammar of hope, moreover, not only structures
a discourse of mutual respect for agents to engage one another in “the
ethical commonwealth,” it also opens the possibility for speaking of
God in ways that are morally appropriate to an anthropology of finite
reason in which the vocation of humanity is completed in a social
attainment of “the highest good.” This connection between a social
space for mutual respect and a discourse about God is signaled by
Kant’s placement of an explicit treatment of proper ways to speak of
God morally at the conclusion of his account, in part 3 of Religion, of
the establishment and the moral dynamics of the ethical
commonwealth. This suggests that it is within the moral space of an
ethical commonwealth that a grammar of hope most appropriately
authorizes speaking of God as “moral ruler of the world.” Kant takes
this expression to mark the primary mode of human
religious/theological discourse, within which various aspects of such
moral rule—holy lawgiver, benevolent ruler and moral guardian, just
judge—may also be aptly spoken as morally true of God.26
Two aspects of this discussion in Religion of the proper moral
grammar for speaking of God are of particular note. The first is that
this discourse continues to function under apophatic strictures that
remind us that even this moral grammar speaks first of what God is
not. What is said of God in such a moral grammar is not about the
“nature” of God, which is cognitively inaccessible to finite reason; it
bears, instead, primarily on the relation in which we, as moral beings,
stand to God. It is not about “God as God” but about “God for us”
morally.27 The second is that Kant views this relation as one in which
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the primary operative dynamic, like that of the ethical commonwealth,
is the moral one of mutual respect for freedom: a divine respect for
human freedom that holds humanity morally accountable and a human
respect for divine freedom that acknowledges that human finitude
cannot comprehend the mode of that divine freedom’s enactment,
save in terms of its steadfast respect for the exercise of human
freedom. Kant seems well aware of Christian theology’s long-standing
vocabulary and grammar of grace for speaking of this relationship, and
part of his discussion includes his proposals for restructuring the
grammar of terms such as “call,” “satisfaction,” and “election” along
lines that both pay close attention to apophatic strictures and
acknowledge the centrality of a mutually engaged respect for
freedom.28 Even though we cannot know positively how that action of
the divine that Christian theology speaks of as grace concretely works,
we can affirm that it will not work in ways counter to the inmost
dynamics of human finite freedom.
This discussion in Religion provides a concrete instance of the
working out of Kant’s famous claim cited earlier: “Thus I had to deny
knowledge in order to make room for faith.”29 A denial of knowledge
with respect to the workings of grace is for Kant crucial to the mutual
respect for freedom that is central to Kant’s construal of the moral
relation of the human to the divine. The hiddenness of God with
respect to finite reason’s cognitive grasp of the moral working of the
world is fundamental for the integrity of the finite freedom that
constitutes the human.30 A proper human acknowledgment of God is
one that issues from—and is most properly spoken by—a human
freedom that is itself attentive to the respect for the moral order of
human freedom with which the divine acts.31 In accord with this
principle, Kant recognizes that the centerpiece of the Book of Job is
not the vindication found in the restoration of Job’s prior prosperity,
but in the divine commendation that Job had spoken rightly—that is,
both with correct insight and with integrity—about the integrity of his
own human finitude and about the inscrutable integrity of the workings
of the divine.32
In addition to structuring what we may say of “God for us”
morally as a discourse of a mutual divine and human respect for
freedom, a Kantian grammar of hope may also function to license a
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form of speaking religiously with respect to human mutual interaction,
that is, for articulating how human responsibility for the social shape
and dynamics of their moral interaction bears upon humanity’s moral
relation to God.33 Although Kant does not explicitly move his account
in this direction, there are parallels between his discussions of the
ethical commonwealth and of perpetual peace that suggest this
possibility. These possibilities turn upon, first, Kant’s affirmation of
both the ethical commonwealth and perpetual peace as socially
formative for humanity’s attainment of its highest good, a task
enjoined upon humanity as a categorical imperative; and, second,
upon Kant’s further affirmation that attaining a full social unity and
harmony of the concrete conditions that are needed to bring about the
highest good seems beyond the capacity of human efforts alone.34
From the perspective of our finite reason, the full attainment of either
perpetual peace or an ethical commonwealth does not present itself to
us as a matter of the theoretical certainty that comes with knowledge,
but as a matter of the moral assurance that comes with hope. Kant
sees such hope arising from our doing all that we must and can to
bring about these moral ends—though we must do so in an apophatic
mode that, even as it allows us to speak of that which finally brings
such good about as “nature” or as “providence,” leaves in darkness
both the “when” and the “how” of that final outcome. When we speak
of that larger ordering principle as providence, it creates a space that
enables us to speak of what we do for the attainment of this outcome
as precisely a social good in terms that appropriately place it with
respect to humanity’s relation to the divine. As I will suggest below, it
allows us to speak of what we as humans do with one another to bring
about peace as genuinely “godly” action.
Kant’s clearest and most eloquent presentations of this dynamic
of hope may well be on the concluding pages of the Rechtslehre, part
1 of The Metaphysics of Morals:
What is incumbent on us as a duty is rather to act in conformity
with the idea of that end, even if there is not the slightest
theoretical likelihood that it can be realized, as long as its
impossibility cannot be demonstrated either.
Now morally practical reason pronounces in us its
irresistible veto: there is to be no war, neither war between you
and me in the state of nature nor war between us as states . . .
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for war is not the way in which everyone should seek his rights.
So the question
is no longer whether perpetual peace is something real or a
fiction, and whether we are not deceiving ourselves in our
theoretical judgments when we assume that it is real. Instead,
we must act as if it is something real, though perhaps it is not;
we must work toward establishing perpetual peace and the kind
of constitution that seems to us most conducive to it (say, a
republicanism of all states, together and separately) in order to
bring about perpetual peace . . . And even if the complete
realization of this objective always remains a pious wish, still we
are certainly not deceiving ourselves in adopting the maxim of
working incessantly toward it.35
Kant does not expect humanity to wait around for nature or
providence to bring about the peace that, in the absence of hope, we
think we cannot. He rather takes it to be a human responsibility to
move forward toward peace in view of that hope: hope licenses saying,
in consequence of the imperative “there is to be no war,” that humans
can and must find ways of social governance that will bring an end to
war, even though it appears an impossible goal.36 A grammar of hope
provides the moral discourse of human mutual respect with a syntax
for envisioning possibilities—for saying “we can”—for the
establishment of structures and conditions of social governance that
befit our human condition of finite rationality. Hope expands the
horizon of moral possibility for actions effecting peace. Within this
space, the grammar of hope enables us, first, to speak of what ought
to be done to make possible a state of enduring peace among peoples
and, second, to affirm that such a state can only come about only to
the extent that humanity acts on the hope that its efforts both are
necessary and will be effective for bringing it about.
How then does the hope that Kant thinks makes it possible for
efforts to engage one another in effective cooperation for the securing
of lasting peace also make it possible to speak of these efforts in terms
that bear upon humanity’s relation to the divine? One answer to this
may be found if we attend to the connection that Kant’s discussion of
the ethical commonwealth in part 3 of Religion has to the social and
political images that he uses in part 2 in his philosophical
reconstruction of Christian teaching about how God effects human
redemption in the person of “the Son of God.” Kant’s reconstruction
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casts that teaching as a conflict between radical evil and the good
principle which has rightful claim to moral dominion over human
beings. Even though he voices significant objections to the language of
vicarious satisfaction that an important stream of Christian theology
uses to describe how the good principle triumphs, Kant affirms the
language of freedom that theology has also used to present the
redemptive activity of “the Son of God” as a liberation with social as
well as personal effects:
by exemplifying this principle (in the moral idea) that human
being [Jesus] opened the doors of freedom to all who, like him,
choose to die to everything that holds them fettered to earthly
life to the detriment of morality; and among these he gathers
unto himself “a people for his possession, zealous of good
works” under his dominion, while he abandons to their fate all
who prefer moral servitude.37
While throughout his discussion Kant clearly avoids affirming the
divinity of Jesus as it has been construed in Christian orthodoxy, he
still uses the term “Son of God” in ways that indicate that he takes the
gospel narratives of Jesus (whose name Kant does not employ) to
offer a robust description of what it is for a human be “godly”—that is,
to act morally as God acts morally. To the extent that Kant views the
activity of redemption as socially ordered—i.e., that it serves the moral
freedom not only of individual human agents, but also of humanity as
a species—Jesus’s most “godly” activity was to make it possible for
human beings to have the moral freedom to establish a social order in
which they live with each other in ways that manifest full respect for
one another’s freedom. In traditional theological terms, this most
godly activity is exhibited in work humanity does in the establishment
of “the Kingdom of God.”
The close connection that Kant makes between the ethical
commonwealth and the establishment of an international order for
enduring peace—particularly in view of the intensity with which he
proclaims the latter as a categorical imperative—suggests that human
efforts to engage one another in effective cooperation for the securing
of lasting peace constitute for Kant the way in which a finite humanity
comes closest to being “godly” by doing what God does. A Kantian
grammar of hope thus provides a way of speaking of the human moral
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relation to God as one in which human beings can envision themselves
as called and empowered to do as God does, as they work with one
another for securing an order of enduring peace for humankind. In this
way, Kant construes religious language to offer a grammar of hope
that exhibits the articles of faith as meaningful for the lasting
establishment of a community of mutual respect predicated upon the
self-legislative (i.e., free) pursuit of the welfare of all.
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